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We introduce preferential behavior into the study on statistical mechanics of money
circulation. The computer simulation results show that the preferential behavior can
lead to power laws on distributions over both holding time and amount of money held
by agents. However, some constraints are needed in generation mechanism to ensure the
robustness of power-law distributions.
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1. Introduction
Empirical studies on many social issues show that numerous statistical distributions
follow power laws, such as stock-price fluctuations1, the probability distribution of
the population of cities2, the degree distributions in many networks3 and distribu-
tion of income or wealth4,5. In particular, the wealth distribution which is an old
topic has recently been renewed by a small band of econophysicists6. They proposed
multi-agent interaction models to explore the mechanism of wealth distribution,
in which wealth is simply represented by money7,8. However, to our knowledge,
the simulation results of these works show that the steady states of money have
Gibbs or Gamma distributions, leaving the power-law phenomena of wealth distri-
bution unexplained. It has been shown that preferential behavior assumption plays
an essential role in generating power-law distributions in some cases, such as in
networks3 and in money dynamics9. The soul of preferential assumption is to break
the equality among agents, some of which are entitled to more power in getting
corresponding entity. In this paper, we investigate how the individual preferential
behavior generates power law phenomena in money circulation process. The statis-
tical distributions involved in monetary circulation are composed of two aspects.
One is over the time interval the money stays in agents’ hands which is named as
holding time10, the other is over the amount of money held by agents.
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2. Power Law Distribution over Holding Time
The model in this section is an extension of ideal gas-like model7, where each agent
is identified as a gas molecule and each trading as one elastic (two-body) collision.
In this model, the economic system is assumed to be closed, thus the total amount
of money M before and after transaction is conserved and the number of agents N
remains constant. Since the scale and initial distribution of money have no effect
on the final results, most of our simulations were carried out with N = 250 and
M = 25, 000 and the amount of money held by each agent was set to be M/N
at the beginning. The money is possessed by agents individually and agents can
exchange money with each other. In each round, an arbitrary pair of agents i and j
gets engaged in a trade among which agent i is randomly picked to be the “payer”
and the other one j becomes the “receiver”. The amount of money transferred is
determined by the following equation
∆m = ε(mi +mj)/2, (1)
where ε distributes randomly and uniformly within an interval [0, 1].
In the original ideal gas-like models, the money paid out is chosen with equal
probability, which has been discussed in Ref. 10. In the extension model, the prefer-
ential behavior is introduced by imposing the unequal probability. In a given round,
agent i with money mi in hand is the payer, the probability of money k among mi
to be transferred is given by:
p(k) =
lk + 1∑mi
n=1(ln + 1)
; (2)
where ln is the times that money n has participated in trade since the beginning of
simulation. Here, we express the probability with exchange times plus 1 instead of
exchange times in case that denominator be zero at the beginning of simulations.
In simulations, the interval between the first two exchanges for one unit of money
to participate in is recorded as its holding time after most of money(≥ 99.9% in our
simulations) had been exchanged at least one time. Then, after most of money(≥
95%) are recorded, the sampling of the holding times of money in this system is
completed.
Each of the results shown in Figure 1 is an average of 500 simulations. It can be
found that the holding time distribution does not follow Gibbs-Boltzmann distri-
bution any more after the introduction of preferential behavior. There is an initial
growth of P (t) from t = 0, which quickly saturates and then a long range of power-
law decay in P (t) for large t value is observed. This decay, when fitted to power law
P (t) ∝ t−ν , gives ν = −3.67 ± 0.05. We also examined the holding time distribu-
tions in several periods long enough after the system had achieved stationary state,
and we found the power distribution is remarkably robust, e.g., the holding time
distribution is stationary even after t = 500, 000 while it has been observed after
t = 1, 000.
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Fig. 1. The stationary distributions of holding
time with and without preference in the semi-
logarithmic scale. The inset shows the distri-
bution with preference in a double-logarithmic
plot. Note that in the figure the probabilities
have been scaled by the maximum probability.
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Fig. 2. The stationary distributions of money
with and without preference. The inset shows
the distribution with preference in a double-
logarithmic plot. Note that in the figure the
probabilities have been scaled by the maximum
probability.
3. Power Law Distribution over Money Held
Previous studies on money distribution are all carried out within the framework
of ideal gas-like models. We introduced the preferential behavior into such kinds
of model by assuming that the agent with more money has larger probability to
win or to be chosen to participate in the trade. However slightly the preferential
propensity is set, we get the same final result: one agent achieves all of the money.
This indicates that preferential behavior is not enough to produce robust power-law
distributions in such case. Thus, in this section, the effects of preferential behavior
on money distribution will be analyzed within a new framework.
In what follows, the initial setting of the system is the same with the ideal gas-
like model, N = 250,M = 25, 000 and each agent has 100 units of money in hand at
the beginning. The main novel mechanism introduced here is to assume that every
agent pays money out to others in each round, and the amount of money paid out
is determined randomly. As to how to dispense the money, there are two modes.
One is that the others have equal probability to receive each unit of money; the
other one is that the probability pi,j at which agent i gets the money from agent j
satisfies
pi,j =
mi
∑N
n=1(n6=j) mn
, (3)
where mi is the amount of money held by agent i before the trade. Please note the
constraint n 6= j in this rule eliminates the possibility for the payer to get back the
August 7, 2018 6:32 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE powerlaw-ding
4 Ning Ding, Yougui Wang, Jun Xu and Ning Xi
money he has paid out. It is obvious that the second mode is with preference, in
which the rich have higher probability to get richer.
The simulation results of the two modes are shown in figure 2, both of which are
averages of 500 simulations. And they reveal clearly that the preferential behavior
does have effects on the probability distribution of money. The stationary distribu-
tion of money without preference is a Gamma type. After the preferential behavior
is introduced into the model, the power-law distribution is observed, and the fitting
to power law gives exponent γ = −1.60 ± 0.02. Further measurement performed
after t = 500, 000 shows that the distribution is quite robust.
In the simulations, if we removed the constraint n 6= j in Eq.(3), we found that
for t = 500, 000, more than 80% of the money was acquired by one agent. It can be
forecasted that after enough long time, all of money would be held by one agent.
This fact means that only preferential behavior without any constraints can not
induce power laws.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we studied the effect of preferential behavior on probability distribu-
tions of both aspects of the circulation of money. We performed computer simula-
tions to show how the preferential behavior produces power-law distributions over
holding time and money held respectively. It is also worth noting that some con-
straints may be necessary to ensure the robustness of power laws. The conclusion
may be valuable to the understanding on the mechanism of power laws.
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